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ESSAY
CONSIDER THE SOURCE: WHEN THE
HARASSER IS THE BOSS
Susan Grover*
Kimberley Piro**
In Consider the Source, Susan Grover and Kim Piro argue for a change
in the analysis that courts apply to determine whether actionable workplace
harassment has occurred. They identify a gap in current doctrine, which
allows courts to ignore the status of the harasser as co-worker or
supervisor. The authors argue that harassment at the hands of a supervisor
is necessarily more severe and pervasive than the same harassment by a coworker. As a result, they recommend that the harasser's identity as a
supervisor or co-worker be treated as a necessary consideration when
courts assess whether actionable harassment has occurred.
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INTRODUCTION
What is the difference between these two experiences?
Scenario 1: You are an unskilled office worker. A coworker tells you
that you are not a valued employee. The coworker then opines that
people of your national origin are stupid.
Scenario 2: You are an unskilled office worker. Your immediate
supervisor tells you that you are not a valued employee. The supervisor
then opines that people of your national origin are stupid.

Most people find abuse1 inflicted by the boss to be more painful than abuse
inflicted by a coworker.2 The difference3 between a supervisor’s and a
coworker’s power to injure means that the harasser’s identity should be a
pivotal factor in every harassment case.4 The power to injure and the
degree of the resulting injury matter because harassment is actionable only
if the target experiences abuse serious enough to “alter the conditions of
[the target’s] employment.”5 Courts thus should distinguish between
supervisors and other6 categories of abusers when gauging whether a
target’s experience of abuse is serious enough to qualify as harassment.
Although the victim’s experience of the conduct as abusive is an essential
facet of proving that harassment occurred, and although the supervisory
status of the harasser exacerbates that experience, the current analytic
framework for assessing workplace harassment does not require courts to
consider whether the harasser is the target’s supervisor.7 Ignoring the
1. This Essay uses the terms “abuse” and “abuser” to refer to hostile workplace conduct
generally and one who perpetrates it. The term “harassment” is used to refer to conduct
relating to the legal action of harassment. The term “harasser” is used to connote the
individual accused of harassment, even though the individual may be innocent.
2. See infra Part III (describing studies that found abuse from supervisors to be more
harmful than abuse from coworkers).
3. See infra Part III; notes 96–105 and accompanying text.
4. In this Essay, “harassment” refers to discriminatory harassment on any of the
grounds prohibited under the federal antidiscrimination laws, including race, sex, national
origin, religion, color, disability, and age.
5. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). The law requires that the
plaintiff meet this standard both subjectively and objectively: the plaintiff actually
experienced the treatment as abusive and a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s situation
would have experienced the treatment as abusive. See id. at 21–22.
6. There are, of course, several types of third-party abusers, including customers and
members of the general public. The law analyzes co-worker abuse much as it analyzes other
third-party abuse. Thus, the distinctions this Essay draws between supervisor abuse and
coworker abuse may also be drawn between supervisor abuse and third-party abuse. For
examples of abuse by customers and the general public, see Galdamez v. Potter, 415 F.3d
1015 (9th Cir. 2005) and Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062 (10th Cir. 1998).
7. See infra Part III. The harasser’s status as a supervisor figures prominently at the
stage after harassment has been assessed, when courts are determining whether the employer
should be held vicariously liable for proven harassment. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764–65 (1998). The formal inclusion of that status as a factor at the
liability phase does nothing to obviate the need to consider it at the harassment assessment
phase.
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harasser’s supervisory role skews results in favor of employers.8 Nothing
in U.S. Supreme Court doctrine precludes consideration of harasser identity
when the victim’s experience is assessed, and some courts have expressly
taken harasser identity into account.9 Most courts do not,10 however, and
this Essay argues that they should.
Part I of this Essay outlines the standard for hostile work environment
harassment as defined by the Supreme Court, with particular emphasis on
the “severe or pervasive” totality of the circumstances test. Part II discusses
recent cases from lower courts, which purport to apply the totality test, but
reach erroneous results because of a failure to consider the harasser’s
supervisory role. Part III explains why abusive conduct is inherently both
more severe and more pervasive when initiated by supervisors than when
initiated by coworkers, and proposes that courts should consistently
consider the status of the harasser as supervisor or coworker when
evaluating the severity or pervasiveness of the alleged harasser’s conduct.
In conclusion, Part IV advocates that the harasser’s status as supervisor be
incorporated as an essential factor in the determination of whether
harassment has occurred.
I. SUPREME COURT STANDARD
Title VII does not mention discriminatory harassment,11 and more than
twenty years passed between Title VII’s enactment in 1964 and the
Supreme Court’s first recognition of a harassment cause of action in 1986.12
The analytic framework for discriminatory harassment was another ten
years in the making and continues to be a work in progress.13
During Title VII’s early years, there was disagreement about if and when
harassment claims were actionable under Title VII.14 The typical Title VII
case involved official employer actions, such as pay discrimination or

8. See, e.g., Murphy v. City of Aventura, 616 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1277 (S.D. Fla. 2009)
(finding that conduct at issue “lack[ed] severity” despite harasser’s supervisory role);
Enriquez v. U.S. Cellular Corp., No. 06 C 3135, 2008 WL 4925012, at *10–15 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 14, 2008) (holding no hostile work environment created by supervisor harasser);
Akonji v. Unity Healthcare, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 2d 83, 96–99 (D.D.C. 2007) (granting
defendant’s motion for summary judgment because acts of harassment by supervisor were
not sufficiently severe).
9. See, e.g., Steck v. Francis, 365 F. Supp. 2d 951, 966–75 (N.D. Iowa 2005); Hargrave
v. County of Atlanta, 262 F. Supp. 2d 393, 416 (D.N.J. 2003).
10. This is most evident when courts cite coworker cases to support a conclusion that
abuse by a supervisor did not constitute actionable harassment. See, e.g., Enriquez, 2008 WL
4925012, at *11; Akonji, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 98.
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).
12. See generally Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
13. This framework has been the work of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence as well as
congressional action in 1991. The 1991 Civil Rights Act added compensatory damages for
cases of environmental harassment. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a.
14. See Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 818–23 (1991) (discussing
the early debates surrounding the inclusion of sexual harassment as an actionable claim
under Title VII).
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termination.15 Because harassment did not always involve concrete
employer action, it was not clear whether harassment fell within the
purview of Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination in the “terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment.”16 Most courts did allow a sex
discrimination cause of action where employees were penalized for
declining supervisors’ sexual advances.17 Such “quid pro quo” cases were
deemed to meet the statutory criterion of discrimination “because of [the
victim’s] sex”18 because they involved concrete action taken against the
victim, arguably motivated by the victim’s sex.19 Some courts went beyond
quid pro quo cases and also recognized discriminatory hostile environment
claims, even in the absence of concrete employment action taken against the
target, as long as the harassment was motivated by a protected trait, such as
race or sex.20 Nevertheless, until 1986, there was much uncertainty about
15. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67–68 (casting aside the lower court’s more traditional view
that an economic effect on the plaintiff’s employment was necessary to establish a claim
under Title VII).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); see Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (citing Henson v. Dundee,
682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982); Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)).
17. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68. “‘It is without question that sexual harassment of
female employees in which they are asked or required to submit to sexual demands as a
condition to obtain employment or to maintain employment or to obtain promotions falls
within protection of Title VII.’” Id. (quoting Vinson v. Taylor, No. 78-1793, 1980 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10676, at *23 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 1980)); see also B. Glenn George, Employer Liability
for Sexual Harassment: The Buck Stops Where?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 3–4 & nn.13–
22 (1999) (discussing the greater ease with which courts accepted a quid pro quo harassment
cause of action under Title VII than a hostile environment cause of action).
18. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2010).
19. See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683
(1998). Schultz has written,
Although this sexual desire-dominance paradigm represented progress when it was
first articulated as the foundation for quid pro quo sexual harassment, using the
paradigm to conceptualize hostile work environment harassment has served to
exclude from legal understanding many of the most common and debilitating
forms of harassment faced by women (and many men) at work each day. The
prevailing paradigm privileges conduct thought to be motivated by sexual
designs—such as sexual advances—as the core sex- or gender-based harassment.
Yet much of the gender-based hostility and abuse that women (and some men)
endure at work is neither driven by the desire for sexual relations nor even sexual
in content.
Id. at 1686–87 (citations omitted). For a discussion of “courts’ initial reluctance to hold that
supervisors’ demands for sexual favors occurred ‘because of sex’ within the meaning of the
statute,” see id. at 1689.
It should be noted that there is good reason to believe that sexual advances by a
superior against an inferior employee originate from a goal of oppression of the subordinate,
exerting power and maintaining a status quo of subordination, rather than from motivation
based upon sex. See John W. Whitehead, Eleventh Hour Amendment or Serious Business:
Sexual Harassment and The United States Supreme Court’s 1997–1998 Term, 71 TEMP. L.
REV. 773, 784–86 (1998) (discussing sexual harassment as an abuse of authority rooted in
dominance rather than desire). Nevertheless, most courts assume hostile conduct of a sexual
nature to be “because of sex.” See Veronica Diaz, Note, Playing Favorites in the Workplace:
Widespread Sexual Favoritism as Actionable Discrimination Under Miller v. Department of
Corrections, 16 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 165, 189–90 (2006) (citing relevant cases).
20. The courts’ ultimate acceptance of sexually hostile environment claims was
predicated on their well-established acceptance of racially hostile environment claims. See
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allowing a Title VII claim for hostile environment harassment in the
absence of economic harm.21 In the 1986 case of Meritor Savings Bank,
FSB v. Vinson,22 the Supreme Court recognized the hostile environment
cause of action.23
Mechelle Vinson sued under Title VII for discriminatory harassment,
even though her harassing supervisor had not taken official adverse action
against her.24 Vinson complained that her supervisor, Sidney Taylor,
“made repeated demands upon her for sexual favors . . . fondled her in front
of other employees, followed her into the women’s restroom when she went
there alone, exposed himself to her, and even forcibly raped her on several
occasions.”25 The defendant bank26 argued that harassment claims were
cognizable only if the plaintiff had experienced economic harm.27 The
Supreme Court rejected that argument, concluding that a hostile
environment is injury enough to violate the Title VII prohibition against
discrimination in the terms or conditions of employment.28 The Court
distinguished such environmental claims from “quid pro quo” harassment
cases, in which a supervisor threatens to take job-related action against the
victim, but recognized both as actionable under Title VII.29

Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998) (citing race and national-origin
cases upon which the Meritor Court predicated recognition of an environmental sexual
harassment claim).
21. See Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 938–39 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (reversing lower
court’s holding that “sexual harassment does not in itself represent discrimination ‘with
respect to . . . terms, conditions, or privileges of employment’ within the meaning of Title
VII”). Prior to Meritor, although courts had recognized hostile environment racial
harassment cases, they had not uniformly recognized hostile environment sex-motivated
harassment. See, e.g., Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238 (“One can readily envision working
environments so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional
and psychological stability of [racial] minority group workers, and I think . . . Title VII was
aimed at the eradication of such noxious practices.”).
22. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
23. Id. at 73.
24. Id. at 64.
25. Id. at 60.
26. Under Title VII, claims are cognizable against the employer, not the individual
wrongdoer. See Wilson v. Wayne County, 856 F. Supp. 1254, 1264–65 (M.D. Tenn. 1994).
27. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64. Interestingly, Vinson took indefinite sick leave because of
the harassment and then was discharged by the bank for excessive use of that leave, but there
were no allegations of constructive discharge. Id. at 60. For later Supreme Court case law on
constructive discharge in harassment cases, see Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542
U.S. 129 (2004). Title VII makes it “an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . .
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). The Meritor Court concluded that “terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment” include the environment in which employees work
and therefore if that environment is discriminatorily hostile or abusive, Title VII is violated.
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 63–67.
28. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 73.
29. Id. at 65–67. In modern parlance, most discriminatory harassment is of the hostile
environment variety. The alternative theory, “quid pro quo” harassment, is actionable when
the employee undergoes adverse employment action for failing to submit to a supervisor’s
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In Meritor, the Court thus began the process of delineating the contours
of actionable harassment. Specifically, the Court established the “severe or
pervasive” standard that endures as an essential element of the hostile
environment claim.30 It tied this standard directly to the statutory language
of Title VII, announcing that, “[f]or sexual harassment to be actionable, it
must be sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the
victim’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.’”31
Some lower courts construed this new standard grudgingly. They
required plaintiffs to prove both severity and pervasiveness (even though
the test had been articulated in the disjunctive), document psychological
injury, or show some other additional harm.32 Additionally, courts often
refused to recognize gender-motivated harassment unless it was sexual in
nature.33 Summary judgment for an employer was common when a
plaintiff’s allegations did not involve “unwelcome sexual advances or other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.”34

sexual demands. See Diaz, supra note 19, at 183 (explaining the differences between “quid
pro quo” claims and hostile environment claims).
30. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67. Today, in order to establish a case of hostile environment
discriminatory harassment, the plaintiff must prove four elements. First, the plaintiff must
have been subjected to unwelcome conduct. See id. at 68 (“The gravamen of any sexual
harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were ‘unwelcome.’”). Second, the
conduct must have been sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the
victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment. See Harris v. Forklift
Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). Third, the work environment must have been objectively
hostile or abusive and the victim must have subjectively perceived the environment as
hostile or abusive. See id. at 21–22. Fourth, the victim must have possessed a trait protected
by Title VII and the conduct must have been based on this trait. See Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998).
The elements are the same regardless of whether the motive for the harassment is the
victim’s sex, race, age, disability, or other protected trait. See, e.g., Miller v. Kenworth of
Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002) (applying the standard in a harassment
claim by Mexican-Americans). Doctrines developed under Title VII are generally
transferable to all traits protected by Title VII and also to traits protected by other statutory
schemes. Courts sometimes move the order around a bit—for example, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has required the employee to show that (1) she belongs to a
protected group, (2) she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment, (3) the harassment
was based on sex, (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of her
employment, and (5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment in
question and failed to take prompt remedial action. See Harvill v. Westward Commc’ns,
L.L.C., 433 F.3d 428, 434 (5th Cir. 2005); see also Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238,
1245 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
31. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th
Cir. 1982)). The Court concluded that Vinson’s allegations, which included acts of rape,
stated a claim for “hostile environment” sexual harassment. Id.
32. See Heather L. Kleinschmidt, Note, Reconsidering Severe or Pervasive: Aligning
the Standard in Sexual Harassment and Racial Harassment Causes of Action, 80 IND. L.J.
1119, 1124–29 (2005) (discussing the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit’s
interpretation of the standard as “severe and pervasive” rather than “severe or pervasive”);
see also Harris, 510 U.S. at 22 (finding error in the lower court’s requirement of
demonstrating psychological harm to establish a hostile work environment cause of action).
33. See Schultz, supra note 19, at 1716–20.
34. Id. at 1718 (citation omitted).
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The Supreme Court revisited the legal standards for harassment in 1993
in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.35 Harris affirmed Meritor’s severe or
pervasive standard.36 As with the Meritor holding, however, lower courts
have sometimes exaggerated the limits that Harris imposes on the
plaintiff’s case.37
Theresa Harris’s supervisor repeatedly insulted Harris because she was a
woman. His verbal abuse included calling Harris “a dumb ass woman” and
making statements such as, “You’re a woman, what do you know?” and
“We need a man as the rental manager.”38 In addition to these nonsexual
(but gender-motivated) insults, the supervisor engaged in inappropriate
sexual antics and comments.39 He publicly suggested to Harris that the two
of them should “‘go to the Holiday Inn to negotiate [Harris’s] raise.’”40 He
asked “female employees to get coins from his front pants pocket” and
“threw objects on the ground, [asking the women] to pick the objects up.”41
He also made sexual innuendos about the clothing worn by Harris and other
women.42
The lower court rejected Harris’s claim of hostile environment
harassment because the abuse had not caused secondary effects.43 The
court found that “some of [the supervisor’s] comments ‘offended [Harris],
and would offend the reasonable woman,’” but were not severe enough to
constitute harassment.44
The Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the lower court’s requirement that
Although psychological harm and
secondary effects be shown.45
interference with work performance may be relevant to a showing of
harassment, the Court stated, they are not necessary to that showing.46 The
35. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
36. Id. at 21–22.
37. See, e.g., Lakshman v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 328 F. Supp. 2d 92, 112 (D. Me. 2004)
(finding the facts in the case “different in degree and kind” from the Harris case); Stoeckel
v. Envtl. Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 882 F. Supp. 1106, 1115 (D.D.C. 1995) (declining to find the
harasser’s conduct sufficiently egregious).
38. Harris, 510 U.S. at 19 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 20 (describing secondary effects as harm to Harris’s psychological well-being
or interference with her work performance).
44. Id. (quoting the appendix to the plaintiff’s petition for certiorari). The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court in an unpublished opinion. See
generally Harris v. Forklift Sys., Nos. 91-5301, 91-5871 and 91-5822, 1992 WL 229300 (6th
Cir. Sept. 17, 1992).
45. Harris, 510 U.S. at 22.
46. Id. at 23. Prior to Harris, some had argued that a showing of interference with work
performance should be required. Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir.
1986). In Harris, Justice Scalia noted that such a test would have been preferable, but was
not consistent with precedent. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 24–25 (Scalia, J., concurring). Like
psychological injury, however, a showing of interference with work performance might be a
sufficient, though not necessary, condition to finding that harassment had occurred. See id. at
22–23 (majority opinion).
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Harris Court emphasized that the environment itself—without any showing
that the environment caused secondary effects—constitutes a violation of
Title VII.47 To assess the environment, the Supreme Court explained,
courts should ask simply whether the harassment was sufficiently severe or
pervasive to cause the target to have reasonably experienced the challenged
conduct as abusive such that it altered the conditions of employment.48
To determine whether treatment is sufficiently severe or pervasive to be
experienced as abusive, the Court admonished lower courts to consider “all
the circumstances,”49 in essence reiterating the “totality of the
circumstances” test of Meritor.50 Although the Supreme Court emphasized
that courts should focus on a myriad of factors,51 the Court also itemized
some specific factors for courts to consider:
“frequency of the
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably
interferes with an employee’s work performance.”52
Although the Harris Court offered these as merely exemplary, some
lower courts have treated them as a list of requirements, the absence of any
one of which can defeat a plaintiff’s claim.53 This practice of requiring that
47. The Court stated:
A discriminatorily abusive work environment, even one that does not seriously
affect employees’ psychological well-being, can and often will detract from
employees’ job performance, discourage employees from remaining on the job, or
keep them from advancing in their careers. Moreover, even without regard to
these tangible effects, the very fact that the discriminatory conduct was so severe
or pervasive that it created a work environment abusive to employees because of
their race, gender, religion, or national origin offends Title VII’s broad rule of
workplace equality. The appalling conduct alleged in Meritor, and the reference in
that case to environments “so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy
completely the emotional and psychological stability of minority group workers,”
merely present some especially egregious examples of harassment. They do not
mark the boundary of what is actionable.
Harris, 510 U.S. at 22 (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)).
48. See id. at 21. Otherwise, the Court wrote, “the conduct has not actually altered the
conditions of the victim’s employment.” Id. at 21–22.
49. Id. at 23.
50. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986).
51. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 23. In Meritor, the Court cited with approval language from
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guidelines regarding the need to
look at the “totality of the circumstances” when evaluating a claim for sexual harassment.
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69.
52. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.
53. See, e.g., Kleinschmidt, supra note 32, at 1129 (discussing courts’ requirement of
both severity and pervasiveness). See generally Elisabeth A. Keller & Judith B. Tracy,
Hidden in Plain Sight: Achieving More Just Results in Hostile Work Environment Sexual
Harassment Cases by Re-Examining Supreme Court Precedent, 15 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL’Y 247 (2008). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has found that a
plaintiff’s claim against her employer could not survive summary judgment because “a few
inappropriate comments and an unwanted slow dance do not amount to particularly severe
conduct that was threatening or humiliating.” Hocevar v. Purdue Frederick Co., 223 F.3d
721, 738 (8th Cir. 2000). While the supervisor’s behavior may not have altered the
plaintiff’s work environment, the Eighth Circuit clearly misstated the appropriate standard
by requiring conduct to be threatening or humiliating. See Keller & Tracy, supra, at 258–59
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the case meet each factor as if they were elements in a claim has been used
to support a finding of no harassment in very severe cases and very
pervasive cases. Courts, for example, determine that abuse was severe, but
reject the claim because it is not also pervasive.54 Sometimes courts have
rejected claims of harassment where the abuse was clearly severe because
the abuse was not physically threatening or humiliating.55 In fact, the third
and fourth items in the Harris list are logical, relevant factors to consider in
deciding whether the first two factors have been met.56 Requiring a
plaintiff to prove every item in this list of factors imposes a burden far
heavier than the Court intended in either Meritor or Harris,57 and it
distracts from the actual totality of the circumstances test for assessing
whether abuse was severe or pervasive. Harris did nothing to alter the
Meritor requirement that actionable harassment be found as long as the
abuse is severe or pervasive, although it has been treated as narrowing it.
The crucial question of the harasser’s supervisory status has been one
casualty of the courts’ disinclination to apply a true totality of the
circumstances test.
In the Supreme Court’s next encounter with the issue, the Court
reemphasized the breadth and malleability of the totality test. In Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,58 the Court recalled that it had
previously
emphasized . . . that the objective severity of harassment should be judged
from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position,
considering “all the circumstances” [in an] inquiry requir[ing] careful
consideration of the social context in which particular behavior occurs
and is experienced by its target. . . . The real social impact of workplace
behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances,
(stating that the Harris Court “listed factors which may be considered,” including “whether it
is physically threatening or humiliating”).
54. See Keller & Tracy, supra note 53, at 258 & n.78; see also id. at 262 (courts use
pervasiveness as a threshold before getting to the severity issue).
55. See Webb-Edwards v. Orange Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 525 F.3d 1013, 1016–17,
1027–28 (11th Cir. 2008) (awarding summary judgment to defendant where supervisor told
plaintiff she “‘looked hot’” and “should wear tighter clothes” and told her husband that he
was eating her for lunch, finding that the conduct was neither physically threatening nor
humiliating and not sufficiently severe).
56. It is risky to parse the language of a court decision the way we parse statutory text,
since the former has not run the gauntlet designed to achieve the precision of meaning that
lawyers ascribe to the latter. Nevertheless, the text of Harris is both inconsistent with
Meritor and also internally incongruous (since the plain meaning of severe encompasses the
notion of physically threatening). For this reason, what are ostensibly four co-equal factors,
separated by semicolons, should be read so that the last two items are examples of ways that
the elements of (1) pervasiveness and (2) severity may be met. But cf. Keller & Tracy, supra
note 53, at 257 (stating that the Supreme Court precedents provide “explicit guidance”). The
Harris factors listed all go to the question of whether the conduct is severe or pervasive—
i.e., the punctuation is erroneous. See Keller & Tracy, supra note 53, at 259.
57. Perhaps some of the confusion has arisen from the use of semicolons to separate the
four listed items—two of those items being the alternative requirements of severe or
pervasive, and the other two being ways of assessing severe or pervasive.
58. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
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expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by a simple
recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed. Common
sense, and an appropriate sensitivity to social context, will enable courts
and juries to distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing . . . and
conduct which a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would find
severely hostile or abusive.59

Although the Court espoused a broad, context-sensitive approach, it did not
expressly impose a requirement that courts consider the status of the abuser
as the target’s supervisor.60
In a slightly different context, the Supreme Court has recognized the
qualitative distinction between abuse by coworkers and abuse by
The distinction is a crucial factor in the Court’s
supervisors.61
determination of whether employers should be liable for harassment once
the harassment itself has been proven.62 In cases where the harasser is a
supervisor, the employer is automatically liable for that harassment (unless
there is an applicable affirmative defense);63 in cases where the harasser is a
coworker, the employer is liable only if the plaintiff proves that the
employer was negligent in failing to discover and correct the harassment.64
The Court’s decision to treat liability in this fashion hinged largely on
principles of agency law.65
In the more preliminary context of gauging whether harassment has
occurred to begin with, however, the Court has been silent on the
distinction between supervisors and coworkers. Instead, as described
above, its doctrine is put more broadly, in the “totality of the
This Essay argues that the totality of the
circumstances” test.66
circumstances test cannot be applied without considering whether the
alleged harasser is the target’s supervisor. The courts’ consideration of
harasser identity at the subsequent phase of assessing employer liability for

59. Id. at 81–82.
60. Id. at 81.
61. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 763 (1998) (“[A] supervisor’s
power and authority invests his or her harassing conduct with a particular threatening
character . . . .”).
62. There are several distinct questions at issue. First, the courts look to whether a
plaintiff has established that harassment occurred. The courts next ask whether the harasser
is someone for whose acts the employer or institution may be held legally responsible. This
inquiry determines whether there are any defenses the employer or institution may assert, as
different defenses apply for supervisory and coworker harassment. This Essay focuses on
the first question, the determination of whether harassment has occurred.
63. Burlington, 524 U.S. at 745–46, 766.
64. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 799 (1998) (noting that lower
courts “uniformly judg[e] employer liability for co-worker harassment under a negligence
standard”).
65. See, e.g., Burlington, 524 U.S. at 754–55 (stating that Congress intended for the use
of agency principles in applying Title VII); Faragher, 524 U.S. at 797 (applying basic
principles of agency law to determine whether harassing conduct falls within the “scope of
employment”).
66. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986).
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proven harassment does not obviate the need to weigh harasser identity at
the juncture when the court determines whether harassment took place.
II. LOWER COURTS’ APPLICATION OF THE STANDARD—FINDING NO
SEVERITY IN SEVERE CASES AND NO PERVASIVENESS IN PERVASIVE CASES
The Hancock v. Barron Builders67 case is a good example of supervisor
harassment that clearly is both severe and pervasive, but that is found by the
trial court to be neither.68 Hancock involved three female plaintiffs who
alleged that their supervisor created a hostile work environment.69 Over
periods ranging from three to six months, the supervisor made over 100
offensive comments and gestures to the plaintiffs.70 According to the
plaintiffs, the supervisor described the use of sex toys, demonstrated which
sexual positions he preferred, discussed the sexual relations he had with his
wife, talked about videotaping his sexual encounters, talked about the
number of sex partners he had and the occasions on which he had sex,
graphically described situations in which he date-raped women in college,
and asked for money to use at an exotic dancing establishment.71 Two of
the victims resigned from their positions in response to the harassment.72
Yet, the court found that the abuse was not sufficiently severe or pervasive
to meet the Meritor/Harris standard.73
The egregiousness of the abuse that the court found not to constitute
harassment makes Hancock remarkable, but the case is especially
noteworthy for another reason. In concluding that the abuse by a supervisor
was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute harassment, the
Hancock court relied on precedent involving harassment by a coworker.74
The court was oblivious to the reality that what may be legally acceptable at
the hands of a coworker very often is not acceptable coming from the boss.
Equally interesting is Webb-Edwards v. Orange County Sheriff’s
Office.75 Shortly after Richard Mankewich was assigned to supervise
Elaine Webb-Edwards, Mankewich began making inappropriate
67. Hancock v. Barron Builders & Mgmt. Co., 523 F. Supp. 2d 571 (S.D. Tex. 2007).
68. See generally id. For similarly egregious abuse found not to be harassment, see
Gibson v. Potter, 264 F. App’x 397 (5th Cir. 2008); Thornhill v. Finley, Inc., No. CIV.A.071033, 2008 WL 4344887 (W.D. La. Sept. 23, 2008); Davenport v. City of Columbus, No.
4:06-CV-150 (CDL), 2008 WL 2902077 (M.D. Ga. July 23, 2008); Akonji v. Unity
Healthcare, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 2d 83 (D.D.C. 2007); Smith v. America Online, Inc., 499 F.
Supp. 2d 1251 (M.D. Fla. 2007).
69. See Hancock, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 572.
70. Id. at 574. The supervisor in question was both the company president and owner.
Id. at 572.
71. Id. at 573–74.
72. Id. at 572.
73. Id. at 575.
74. Id. at 576 (citing Shepherd v. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, 168 F.3d 871, 874 (5th
Cir. 1999)). In Shepherd, plaintiff alleged that a coworker had harassed her through sexually
explicit comments and physical contact. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the coworker’s
behavior did not create a hostile working environment. Shepherd, 168 F.3d at 874.
75. 525 F.3d 1013 (11th Cir. 2008).
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comments.76 On at least a weekly basis, Mankewich commented that
Webb-Edwards “‘looked hot’” and should wear tighter clothing.77 On one
occasion, when the plaintiff and Mankewich were driving to take a
witness’s statement, Mankewich made a comment about “eating Ms. WebbEdwards for lunch.”78 When plaintiff told Mankewich “that his comments
made her feel uncomfortable,” he told her that if she reported him, she
would not “be getting any other position.”79 The court agreed that
Mankewich’s comments “were taunting and boorish,” but, relying on the
Harris list of factors, concluded that the comments did not constitute
harassment because “[t]hey were not . . . physically threatening or
humiliating” and did not involve physical touching.80 The court, fifteen
years after the Supreme Court’s Harris decision, also relied on the absence
of any showing that the abuse interfered with the plaintiff’s work
performance and noted that most of the comments did not refer to sexual
activity.81 The Webb-Edwards court clearly set the bar for plaintiffs too
high. What might have been merely “taunting and boorish” coming from a
coworker becomes harassment when the source has the power to tell the
target that she “will not be getting any other position” if she reports the
abuse.
Other examples of supervisors’ verbal statements that federal courts have
deemed not severe enough to alter the conditions of employment include
direct sexual propositions in exchange for money,82 use of the words
“hooker,” “slut,” and “whore” to describe an employee’s appearance,83 and
other sexually suggestive inquiries (e.g., whether plaintiff was the “fooling
around type”84 and how wide plaintiff could open her mouth85). Coming
from a coworker, such comments are, at a minimum, offensive. Coming
from a supervisor, they are—for the reasons set forth below—legal
harassment.
Among the most egregious harassment cases, those involving unwanted
physical contact, the federal courts often fail to recognize the heightened
76. Id. at 1016.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1027. This comment was actually made by telephone to plaintiff’s spouse.
Plaintiff’s “husband telephoned her, and asked her if she had lunch plans. Before she could
reply, Sgt. Mankewich grabbed the telephone and told her husband: ‘I don’t know what
you’re saying, but I’m eating your wife.’” Id. at 1017. Mankewich had also commented that
he thought that “women who dye their hair have issues at home.” Id. at 1027.
79. Id. at 1017.
80. Id. at 1027.
81. Id. at 1027–28.
82. See Thornhill v. Finley, Inc., No. CIV.A.07-1033, 2008 WL 4344887, at *1 (W.D.
La. Sept. 23, 2008) (denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment regarding the
plaintiff’s quid pro quo claim and granting the motion regarding the plaintiff’s hostile work
environment claim).
83. See Murphy v. City of Aventura, 616 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1277 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (no
quid pro quo claim asserted in this case, only hostile work environment and retaliation).
84. See Thornhill, 2008 WL 4344887, at *1.
85. See Davenport v. City of Columbus, No. 4:06-CV-150 (CDL), 2008 WL 2902077,
at *7 (M.D. Ga. July 23, 2008).
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severity from the employee’s perspective when the physical assault comes
from a supervisor, rather than a coworker. In these, as in verbal abuse
cases, courts frequently rely on precedents involving coworker physical
harassment situations.86
The case of Enriquez v. United States Cellular Corp.87 is a good
example. There, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
awarded the employer summary judgment against four female employees
who brought a hostile environment claim against their employer.88 The
plaintiffs alleged that their supervisor made three attempts to kiss two of
them in his office, lifted one of them “by the outside of her thighs and
called her ‘juicy’” on two occasions, and lifted one of the plaintiffs off a
table and pulled her legs around his waist at a coworker’s Christmas
party.89 In concluding that such behavior failed to alter the conditions of
employment, the court relied, in part, on precedents involving coworker
harassment.90
Similarly, in Akonji v. Unity Healthcare, Inc.,91 the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia failed to distinguish between supervisor and
coworker conduct. The Akonji court concluded that a supervisor’s conduct
was not sufficiently severe where the male supervisor allegedly hugged and
tried to kiss his female subordinate on two occasions, touched her behind
once, and touched her thigh on another occasion.92 In its severity analysis,
the Akonji court cited the case of Adusumilli v. City of Chicago,93 where
“four isolated incidents in which a coworker briefly touched the plaintiff’s
fingers, arm, or buttocks did not amount to a hostile work environment.”94

86. See, e.g., Enriquez v. U.S. Cellular Corp., No. 06 C 3135, 2008 WL 4925012 (N.D.
Ill. Nov. 14, 2008). Jurisdictions are split as to whether one instance of inappropriate
physical contact is sufficient to establish severity. Compare Brooks v. City of San Mateo,
229 F.3d 917, 921, 926–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that one incident where a coworker
fondled the plaintiff’s breasts at work was not sufficient to support a hostile work
environment claim), with Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062, 1072 (10th Cir. 1998)
(“disagree[ing] with defendants’ assertions that a single incident of physically threatening
conduct can never be sufficient to create an abusive environment”).
87. No. 06 C 3135, 2008 WL 4925012 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 2008).
88. See id. at *1.
89. See id. at *1–3.
90. See id. at *11 (finding that defendant supervisor’s conduct toward one of the
plaintiffs did not rise to the level of severity required to establish a hostile working
environment and supporting this finding with three cases involving coworker harassment
claims).
91. 517 F. Supp. 2d 83 (D.D.C. 2007).
92. See id. at 88, 91. The U.S. District Court for the District of Maine recently cited this
case for support. The opinion noted, however, that the Akonji decision was “surprising.” See
Lacadie v. Town of Milford, Civ. No. 07-101-B-W, 2008 WL 1930410, at n.11 (D. Me.
May 1, 2008).
93. 164 F.3d 353 (7th Cir. 1998).
94. Akonji, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 98 (citing Adusumilli v. City of Chicago, 164 F.3d 353,
361 (7th Cir. 1998)). The Akonji court also cited Shepherd v. Comptroller of Public
Accounts, 168 F.3d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 1999), and Curry v. District of Columbia, 195 F.3d
654, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1999), both of which involve instances of coworker harassment.
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Using this coworker case as support, the Akonji court found that the
supervisor’s conduct was not severe or pervasive.95
On the other hand, some courts have expressly acknowledged that abuse
at the hands of a supervisor is inherently more severe than coworker
abuse.96 In Dandy v. UPS,97 for example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit acknowledged that “‘a supervisor’s use of [a racial epithet]
impacts the work environment far more severely than use by co-equals.’”98
Similarly, under parallel New Jersey state law, courts expressly cite the
harasser’s supervisory status as a factor weighing in favor of finding
severity or pervasiveness of harassment.99
The Supreme Court has supplied guidance, but lower courts diverge from
the path.100 Commentators argue that lower courts are too eager to take
harassment cases from the jury, both at summary judgment and after
verdict.101 They attribute this overzealousness to a constrained reading of
the Supreme Court standards for actionable harassment.102 Although courts
recognize the totality of the circumstances standard, some are quick to
dismiss cases that do not make a strong showing on every factor.103 Yet,
even among these commentators, there has been almost complete silence on
the glaring absence from many court decisions of what should be the central
question in harassment cases: who is doing the harassing?104 Courts
should be more circumspect in taking harassment cases from the jury, and
95. Akonji, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 98; see also Murphy v. City of Aventura, 616 F. Supp. 2d
1267, 1277 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (also citing Adusumilli, 164 F.3d at 357, 361–62, to support its
conclusion regarding the lack of severity of a supervisor’s conduct).
96. See infra Part III (demonstrating how some courts have recognized that the
employer/employee power differential gives supervisors power to damage the workplace).
97. 388 F.3d 263 (7th Cir. 2004).
98. Id. at 271 (quoting Rodgers v. W.-S. Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 675 (7th Cir. 1993)).
99. See Hargrave v. County of Atlanta, 262 F. Supp. 2d 393, 414 n.10 (D.N.J. 2003); id.
at 416 (recognizing that “as the New Jersey Supreme Court has observed, a jury could
reasonably conclude that the impact and severity of [the harasser]’s conduct was aggravated
by the fact that he was a member of the management staff with direct responsibility for
supervising Plaintiff’s work performance”); see also Durling v. Santiago, Civil No. 04-3777
(AET), 2007 WL 2027929, at *5 (D.N.J. July 10, 2007) (citing Hargrave, 262 F. Supp. 2d at
416).
100. See Keller & Tracy, supra note 53, at 250.
101. See id. at 248–49, and works cited therein (notes 12 through 14 are particularly
illuminating).
102. Some courts require plaintiffs to prove both severity and pervasiveness. See
Kleinschmidt, supra note 32, at 1125.
103. Rather than consider the totality of the circumstances, courts seek a litmus test to
resolve the issue. Frequently, that test is simply whether the conduct was physically
threatening or humiliating—in essence, requiring that the plaintiff demonstrate behavior so
egregious that the abuser might well be subject to criminal sanctions for it. Judith Johnson,
License To Harass Women: Requiring Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment To Be
“Severe or Pervasive” Discriminates Among “Terms and Conditions” of Employment, 62
MD. L. REV. 85, 111 (2003).
104. Courts do make this distinction when analyzing employer liability. See supra note 7.
However, this analysis takes place after a determination of whether harassment has occurred.
While all courts consider the identity of the harasser at the liability phase of analysis, most
do not take this into account in their determination of whether the harasser has created a
hostile work environment for the plaintiff.
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they will become more circumspect if they consistently account for the
heightened harm incurred where the harasser is the target’s supervisor. The
most important correction needed in the application of doctrine to facts is
recognition of the prominent role that the alleged harasser’s identity as a
supervisor plays in a target’s experience of harassment.105
III. WHY SUPERVISOR HARASSMENT IS WORSE
Many of us know intuitively that supervisory harassment exceeds
coworker harassment in its capacity to harm. Most obviously, the power
differential between supervisor and subordinate causes the subordinate to
experience supervisor abuse as more serious than coworker abuse. In
addition, the authoritative/fiduciary stature of the supervisor exacerbates the
harm done. Finally, the locus in the hierarchy occupied by the supervisor
generally means that supervisor harassment pervades the workplace more
easily and more thoroughly than coworker harassment. It thus more readily
satisfies the “pervasive” prong of the Supreme Court standard. This part of
the Essay focuses on the three sources of exacerbation: power differential,
authority/fiduciary factors, and locus in the hierarchy contributing to
pervasiveness.
The power differential between the harassing supervisor and targeted
subordinate exacerbates the harm experienced by the subordinate.106 Such
an impact is present whether the harassment is quid pro quo or hostile
environment. Because power differentials have the capacity to worsen107
the target’s experience of the abuse, courts can accurately gauge the target’s
experience only by considering the special power that supervisors possess
to harm subordinates.108
105. The failure to account for harasser identity when actionable harassment is assessed
contributes to courts’ “needless discomfort with how to evaluate conduct” and “an
unjustified number of summary dispositions for defendants and vacated jury determinations
for plaintiffs.” Keller & Tracy, supra note 53, at 256. Other prominent needs include that of
recognizing that sex-motivated harassment need not be sexual. See Schultz, supra note 19, at
1716–20.
106. See Rebecca A. Thacker & Stephan F. Gohmann, Emotional and Psychological
Consequences of Sexual Harassment: A Descriptive Study, 130 J. PSYCHOL. 429, 439 (1996)
(supporting the idea that “sexual harassment from supervisors is a political tactic designed to
assert dominance and authority”).
107. Or ameliorate, if the abuser is the target’s subordinate.
108. Power differentials are actually a theoretical underpinning for the harassment cause
of action. The policies and theories underlying harassment doctrine grew out of the work of
Catharine MacKinnon, and other feminists, whose theories envision the power differential as
a hallmark of harassment at work. See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979); Joanna L.
Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form Over Substance in
Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 34–35, 35 n.192 (2003) (describing
theoretical approaches to power as a basis of harassment and citing articles on role of power
differential in workplace harassment); Thacker & Gohmann, supra note 106, at 439 (citing
Rebecca A. Thacker & Gerald R. Ferris, Understanding Sexual Harassment in the
Workplace: The Influence of Power and Politics Within the Dyadic Interaction of Harasser
and Target, 1 HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. REV. 23 (1991)); Louise Feld, Comment, Along the
Spectrum of Women’s Rights Advocacy: A Cross-Cultural Comparison of Sexual
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In Emotional and Psychological Consequences of Sexual Harassment: A
Descriptive Study,109 researchers reported that “armed with organizational
legitimacy, the [supervisor who harasses] has power over the target in two
ways that are meaningful for a prediction of effects on individuals’
psychological states”110: (1) the target is dependent on the supervisor for
performance ratings, salary increases, and flexible work scheduling,111 and
(2) the supervisor can threaten sanctions for the target’s refusal to
submit.112 Based on these factors, the researchers concluded that the
responses of targets of harassment would be more negative when the
harassment is from supervisors rather than from coworkers.113
In Women’s Responses to Sexual Harassment:
A Multivariate
Analysis,114 researchers similarly found that targets experience harassment
from a supervisor differently from how they experience that from a
coworker.115 Women who experience harassment from supervisors are
especially limited in their responses; they not only opt for less assertive
responses, but are also forced out of their jobs at a much higher rate than
women harassed by peers.116 The study suggested that “women are more
able to adapt a wider range of responses when the source does not have
more organizational power” than the target.117 Thus, women are more
likely to confront or report harassers who do not have supervisory power
over them.118 Alternatively, targets whose harassers are supervisors tend to
experience “worsening . . . feelings about work”119 and are ultimately more
likely to leave.120
Steck v. Francis121 is one of the few cases to have recognized the
essential importance of this power differential to harassment analysis.122

Harassment Law in the United States and India, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1205, 1233–36
(2002).
109. Thacker & Gohmann, supra note 106.
110. Id. at 430.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See id. at 436–39. Although psychological injury is not a requirement in harassment
cases, the degree of harm experienced is relevant to assessing whether the target experiences
the abuse as interfering with the work environment. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510
U.S. 17, 22–23 (1993).
114. James E. Gruber & Michael D. Smith, Women’s Responses to Sexual Harassment:
A Multivariate Analysis, 17 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 543 (1995).
115. See generally id.
116. See id. at 554.
117. Id. at 558.
118. Id. at 547, 556; see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 803 (1998)
(stating that “the victim may well be reluctant to accept the risks of blowing the whistle on a
superior”); Mariejoy Mendoza, Note, Making Friends: Sexual Harassment in the
Workplace, Free Speech, and Lyle v. Warner Bros., 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1963, 1988
(2007) (claiming that “economic dependence” makes subordinate employees less likely to
confront their harassers).
119. Thacker & Gohmann, supra note 106, at 436.
120. Gruber & Smith, supra note 114, at 554.
121. 365 F. Supp. 2d 951 (N.D. Iowa 2005).
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The Steck court explicitly found that “status of the harasser is a ‘relevant
factor’” in the “all the circumstances” test.123 The court also recognized
that “[a]s the harasser moves higher in the hierarchy of the employer,
incidents of harassment become proportionally more severe.”124 In Steck,
the court acknowledged that a harassment victim may have more difficulty
objecting to abuse from a supervisor rather than a coworker due to the
nature of the supervisor-employee relationship.125 The court concluded that
it was fair to assume that the abuser’s high status rendered the abuse
upsetting enough to interfere with plaintiff’s work.126
Similarly, the supervisor’s evaluative function exacerbates the victim’s
experience of harassment at the supervisor’s hands. The employee’s future
with the employer, her pay raises, promotions, and her ability to use the
employer as a reference for future jobs depend on getting good evaluations.
If the harasser is the boss, who is entrusted with the power to evaluate, the
subordinate may reasonably fear that evaluations will be colored by the
boss’s tainted opinion of the subordinate. If the harassment consists of
gender or racial slurs and insults, then the subordinate may logically expect
that the supervisor’s assessment of the subordinate’s performance will be
colored by the low opinion the supervisor has of people in the subordinate’s
racial or gender group. If the harassment involves sexual demands, the
subordinate logically assumes that the supervisor does not value her for her
professional contributions (but instead for her sexuality) and also that denial
122. See id. at 973. As the supervisor harasser is further removed from daily contact with
the victim or as the supervisor harasser rises higher in the hierarchy, harassing incidents may
become the most salient feature of the relationship between the harasser and the victim, even
as they may become less frequent. See Hulsey v. Pride Rests., L.L.C., 367 F.3d 1238, 1248
(11th Cir. 2004) (noting supervisory status of harasser and concomitant power to fire target
as important considerations in the totality test); Ferris v. First Nat’l of Neb., No.
4:04CV3286, 2006 WL 1720488, at *7 (D. Neb. June 20, 2006) (relying on Faragher for the
proposition that supervisors who harass have power to inflict greater harm than coworkers);
cf. Grafton v. Sears Termite & Pest Control, No. 3:98-CV-2596-R, 2000 WL 422911, at *7
(N.D. Tex. Apr. 17, 2000) (“Age-related comments by a coworker who has no authority to
make employment decisions, although rude and inappropriate, are not sufficient to effect a
term condition or privilege of Plaintiff’s employment . . . .”).
123. Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1266 (11th Cir. 1999) (Tjoflat, J.,
dissenting); Rodgers v. W.-S. Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 675 (7th Cir. 1993); Steck, 365 F.
Supp. 2d at 973–74 (citing Peters v. Renaissance Hotel Operating Co., 307 F.3d 535, 552
n.14 (7th Cir. 2002)); Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155 (Mich. 1993); Taylor v. Metzger,
706 A.2d 685 (N.J. 1998)).
124. Steck, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 973.
125. See id. at 972–73 (“This court suggests that victims are and are reasonably perceived
to be more vulnerable to supervisor harassment, because when the harasser is a supervisor,
the harasser may, and often does, find it easier to target and harass the victim. For example,
the harasser can control the circumstances under which the victim must be in his or her
presence and can inflict retribution if the victim does not respond as desired. The victim
could also find it harder, and could reasonably be thought to find it harder, to object to
supervisor harassment, either to the harasser or through other channels. A victim of coworker harassment often is, and is reasonably perceived to be, much more able to object to
harassment to a co-worker’s face, because the victim has less fear of personal, social, or
professional consequences.”).
126. See id. at 975.

516

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

of those demands may yield a negative evaluation or termination of
employment.127
Supervisors have the power to affect subordinates’ professional
reputation and personal definition of professional self. If the supervisor
thinks negatively of the victim, then the victim, as well as others, may
doubt her own merit. Employees who doubt the boss’s good esteem of
them feel defensive and less able to be assertive about performing the
functions of the job.128 Abuse naturally causes the victim to withdraw from
the abuser. If the abuser is the victim’s evaluator, the victim is incapable of
performing with the strength and assertiveness likely to garner high marks
in a professional evaluation.129 Furthermore, if the employee avoids the
supervisor in order to avoid harassment, the employee misses the
opportunity to display capabilities and accomplishments that otherwise
might lead to advancement.
Supervisors have the power to do damage with biased or inaccurate
information about the subordinate, and the subordinate knows that. It is,
after all, the supervisor’s job to assess the victim’s performance and
contributions. Unlike insults from a coworker, “‘[a]ny remark from [a
supervisor] carries with it the power and authority of the office.’”130 The
subordinate feels disempowered to object to the supervisor’s improper
conduct because of reluctance to criticize an individual who both has
authority in the workplace and exerts control over the subordinate’s
employment.131 For this reason, the subordinate feels defenseless—forced
simply to submit to the bad treatment or else to leave.
As figures of authority, moreover, supervisors command trust and
respect. Our culture socializes people to look to supervisors to administer
justice when disputes arise, to allocate resources fairly, and to maintain a
workplace that is hospitable or at least workable. Workers seek to live up
to their supervisors’ expectations and win their approval. They expect
supervisors to deserve the trust the employer has bestowed—to be fair and
equitable in managing the workplace. Because of that, harm at the
supervisor’s hands causes injury greater than harm at the hands of a stranger
or co-equal. There is a breach of trust, just as there is a breach of trust
when parents abuse their children. Thus, there is a double harm in abuse—

127. In fact, if there is a negative evaluation, the victim may have a claim for quid pro
quo harassment, which would be entirely distinct from her hostile environment claim.
128. See Caroline W. Jacobus, Legislative Responses to Discrimination in Women’s
Health Care: A Report Prepared for the Commission to Study Sex Discrimination in the
Statutes, 16 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 153, 321 (1995) (indicating that harassment leads to selfdoubt).
129. Phoebe Weaver Williams chronicles the devastating effect that any harassment can
have on professional performance. See Phoebe Weaver Williams, Performing in a Racially
Hostile Environment, 6 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 287, 308 & n.86 (1996).
130. Steck, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 970 (quoting Taylor v. Metzger, 706 A.2d 685, 692 (N.J.
1998)).
131. See generally id.
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the abuse itself and the loss of faith in someone employees thought they
could trust.
Because it is usually the supervisor who is responsible for work
conditions, there is a vast difference between the power of a supervisor to
alter work conditions (and finding work conditions altered is what makes
abuse actionable as harassment) and the power of a coworker without such
responsibility.132 Whether the supervisor’s obligation to safeguard the
workplace and its occupants is real or perceived does not matter. What
matters is that the supervisor has some control over the work
environment,133 and by virtue of that control, more readily “alter[s] the
conditions of the workplace” by harassing the target.134
The harasser’s status as a supervisor renders abuse pervasive. When a
supervisor is on-site and responsible for all that goes on in the workplace, it
is impossible for the target to ignore or escape the abuse.135 It is often
much easier to ignore or otherwise escape abuse from a coworker. An
effort to escape an abusive boss always entails the risk that the victim will
be found to be—or actually will be—insubordinate when the boss wants to
speak. The victim has no way of knowing whether the boss is giving a
legitimate assignment or subjecting the victim to further abuse. And, the
victim will not know the answer to that question until she stands still to
listen, by which time she will have experienced the abuse, if that is what the
supervisor intends. Because the supervisor has both an illegitimate and a
legitimate function in interacting with the victim, the victim cannot just turn
away from the supervisor whenever the supervisor approaches. This makes
the experience of abuse by a supervisor inescapable and pervasive.
Because of the supervisor’s stature, abuse by a supervisor is more likely
to be emulated by others in the workplace than would abuse by a coworker.
Supervisor abuse “seems to authorize or condone like conduct by
subordinates, thereby fostering a perception that the environment as a whole
is hostile.”136 By giving permission for coworkers to harass and otherwise
disrespect the target, supervisor abuse is likely to lead to abuse by
coworkers. This multiplication effect can taint the entire workplace.
Coworkers may feel entitled to harass if they see the boss engage in such
behavior.137 When such emulation occurs, harassment spreads and
132. Cf. Thacker & Gohmann, supra note 106, at 440.
133. See Estrich, supra note 14, at 855 (claiming that supervisors are “delegated the
power to define the acceptable working conditions of the workplace”).
134. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 62 (2006).
135. See Mendoza, supra note 118, at 1987–88 (citing Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television
Prods., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 511, 519 (Ct. App. 2004), which indicates that victims of workplace
harassment are essentially held “captive” given the existing employment relationship).
Furthermore, “the disparity in power between the harasser and the victim exacerbates the
employee’s captivity.” Id. at 1988.
136. Steck, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 972.
137. Thacker & Gohmann, supra note 106, at 440 (“Ultimately, a culture is created in
which acceptance of sexually harassing behavior is the norm, and this culture further serves
to affect psychological and emotional states of the targets who are uncomfortable with such
behavior.”).
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becomes commonplace, destroying the workplace for the target.138
Because the supervisor may be ubiquitous from the target’s perspective, and
because the supervisor empowers other harassers, supervisor abuse
typically meets the pervasiveness requirement.
The character of supervisor-subordinate abuse, then, necessarily yields
greater harm to the subordinate target than coworker abuse is capable of
yielding. Because of power differentials, because of the supervisor’s
fiduciary role, and because the supervisor is a role model in the workplace,
it is safe to assume that supervisor harassment causes more harm. For this
reason, any assessment of the severity or pervasiveness of workplace
harassment must consider whether the harasser is the supervisor.
IV. PROPOSAL—COURTS SHOULD CONSISTENTLY CONSIDER THE
HARASSER’S IDENTITY IN ASSESSING WHETHER ABUSE IS SUFFICIENTLY
SEVERE OR PERVASIVE TO CONSTITUTE HARASSMENT
This proposal would increase—from one to two—the stages in
harassment litigation when the harasser’s status as a supervisor is a required
component of the analysis. As explained above,139 analysis in harassment
cases proceeds in two stages:
Stage One: Determination of whether harassment has occurred
Stage Two: Determination of whether the employer should be liable for
proven harassment.

Under current law,140 the identity of the harasser is a decisive factor at
the second stage, when employer liability for proven harassment is
assessed. If the plaintiff proves harassment by a coworker, the employer is
liable for that harassment only if the plaintiff also proves that the employer
was negligent in responding or not responding to the harassment.141 If the
plaintiff proves harassment by a supervisor, by contrast, the employer is
presumptively liable, with the possibility of escaping liability only in the
absence of a tangible employment action and only if the employer proves,
in effect, that it was not negligent.142 Harasser identity is thus of paramount
importance at the employer liability phase:
138. Id.
139. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. As explained above, whether the
harassment is proven to have occurred turns on whether the plaintiff proves that the
challenged behavior was (a) unwelcome, (b) motivated by the plaintiff’s national origin, sex,
or other protected trait (race, age, etc.) and (c) sufficiently severe or pervasive to (d) alter a
term, condition, or privilege of employment. See supra note 30. As argued above, the severe
or pervasive analysis requires consideration of whether the harasser is the victim’s
supervisor.
141. See Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 517 F.3d 321, 338 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing
EEOC v. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d 498, 518 (6th Cir. 2001)).
142. See Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 767 (2d Cir. 1998). That
presumption is rebuttable only if the harassment did not culminate in a tangible employment
action, an analysis not relevant here. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742,
760–61 (1998).
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If harasser is a coworker, employer is liable only if negligent.
If harasser is a supervisor, employer is liable, though may sometimes
invoke an affirmative defense.

The primacy given to harasser identity at the liability phase does not
obviate the need to give it a pivotal role in Stage One, in the analysis of
whether harassment has occurred. Frequently, failure to consider the
harasser’s identity as supervisor results in a finding that harassment has not
occurred. Such cases never reach the employer liability phase, so the
question of harasser identity never receives scrutiny. The two analyses are
thus entirely independent of each other, and the strength of a showing on
one cannot compensate for weakness in the other. The proposal of this
Essay is that supervisory status of the abuser should be given strong weight
at the first part of the analysis, when occurrence of harassment is assessed.

